UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-22-2016

Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43576

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43576" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6096.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6096

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
ofthe
STATE OF IDAHO
MARTIN FRANTZ,
Plaintiff-Appellc:Stf
V.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability
Partnership,
Defendant-Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai
The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.

JONATHON FRANTZ
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854

JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH
PAIN HAMBLEN LLP
717 W. Sprague Ave., Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

·COPY
JAN 2 2 2016
Supreme ourt.__ owrt o,

ea

5f.;::,edo,~~:~!l:::::::::=..-i

Table of Contents
Statement of the Case ......................................................................................................... 1
N4TURE OF THE CASE ................................................................................................ 1
COURSE 017 Tl-fE PR.OCEEDLVGS ................................................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................ 3
Pre-Litigation ............................................................................................................. 3
Mr. Katz's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission ............................................................. 6
The Motion to Dismiss ................................................................................................ 9
The Motion for Attorney's Fees ................................................................................. 10
Issues Presented on Appeal ............................................................................................... 11
Argument ........................................................................................................................ 11
MR. FRANTZ JS NOT JUDICIALLY £STOPPED FROM BRINGING THIS LAWSUIT........ 11
THERE WAS NO OTHER ACTION PENDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES ........................ 15
MR. KATZ SHOULD BE ADMJTED PRO HAC VICE ...................................................... 20
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-120(3) ....................... 22
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO J.C.§12-121 ........................... 24
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 25

Appellant's Brief- Pg. i

Cases
Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland, 390 S.C. 312 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) ............................... 19
David v. Perron, 716 NE 2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ................................................................... 19
Eckertv. Freeborn & Peters LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23477 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2015).19, 20
Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24 (2007) ............................................................................................ 20
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 2001) ....................... 16
In re Forbes 58 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) .................................................................. 16, 17
Johnson v. Johnson, 147 Idaho 912 (2009) .................................................................................. 22
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586 (2001) ........................................................................................ 20
Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624 (1995) ................................................................ 25, 26
Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437 (1999) ........................................................................................... 22
McCallister v. Dixon 154 Idaho 891 (2013) ........................................................................... 17, 18
Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968) ......................................................................... 23
Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Tr.), 25 F.3d 1281 (5th

Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................................................. 15
Schlumberger Techs. V Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1997) .................................................. 23
Scott v. Agric. Prods. Corp., 102 Idaho 14 7 (1981) ............................................................... 21, 23
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995) ...................................................................................... 25
Wade v. Bailey 287 B.R. 874 (S.D. Miss. June 26, 2001) ...................................................... 15, 17

Statutes
11 USC §54l(a) ............................................................................................................................ 15
I.R.C.P. §12(b)(8) .................................................................................................................. passim
LC.§ 12-120(3)....................................................................................................................... 26, 27
I.C. §12-121 ............................................................................................................................ 27, 28

Appellant's Brief- Pg. ii

Statement of the Case
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from a legal malpractice/breach of fiduciary duties case between Mr.
Martin Frantz and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell"). In roughly 2009,
a partner at Hawley Troxell, Mr. Merlyn Clark, agreed to act as an expert witness on Mr.
Frantz's behalf. However, during the course of that relationship, Mr. Clark blurred his expert
witness role with that of expert consultant and counseled with Mr. Frantz's attorneys on matters
outside the scope of his expert testimony. Resultantly, Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz fell into an
attorney-client relationship.
However, late in the summer of 2010, Mr. Frantz got into a dispute with his bank, Idaho
Independent Bank (the '·Bank"). Subsequently, the Bank hired Hawley Troxell to represent it in
a contract action against Mr. Frantz. Before that matter was resolved in court, Mr. Frantz filed
for bankruptcy protection in 2011. Hawley Troxell then represented the Bank in the bankruptcy
case, and then again in 2013 in an adversary proceeding against Mr. Frantz. Prior to trial in the
adversary proceeding, Mr. Frantz opposed Hawley Troxell's representation, but the bankruptcy
court denied any relief finding that there was no attorney-client relationship. However, before
the adversary proceeding reached a resolution on the merits, the case was dismissed as moot.
Without a final resolution on the matter, Mr. Frantz filed an action against Hawley
Troxell for malpractice and breach of fiduciary obligations in Idaho district court. At the heart of
the issue at hand, is whether or not the mooted bankruptcy court's decision affects the state court
litigation.
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On February 20, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed his action against Hawley Troxell. On April 7,
2015, Mr. Jefferey Katz moved for pro hac vice admission to represent Mr. Frantz. Hawley
Troxell then, through its attorney, who had not yet appeared in the matter, filed an objection to
Mr. Katz pro hac vice admission on April 22, 2015. About two weeks later, Hawley Troxell's
attorney filed his notice of appearance. Then, a couple days later, on May 7, 2015, Hawley
Troxell filed its Motion to Dismiss or Abate ("Motion to Dismiss"). The two motions were to
have separate hearings so that Mr. Katz, once admitted, would be able to argue the Motion to
Dismiss.
On June 1, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed a reply to Hawley Troxell's objection. A mere two
business days before the hearing thereon, Hawley Troxell, without court approval, submitted a
sur-reply with additional supporting affidavits. As a result, on June 29, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed an
objection to Hawley Troxell's sur-reply and its additional supporting affidavits. At the hearing
on the motion for pro hac vice admission, the district court accepted Hawley Troxell's sur-reply
and supporting documents, but continued the hearing and granted Mr. Frantz time to respond to
Hawley Troxell's sur-reply. Mr. Frantz subsequently filed the court ordered supplemental
briefing supporting Mr. Katz's motion for admission.
Mr. Frantz further filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2015, to which

Hawley Troxell filed a reply. Finally, on July 28, 2015 the court heard oral argument on both
matters. On July 29, 2015, in a written memorandum, the district court denied Mr. Katz's
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pro hac
Hawley Troxell and partly for reasons the district court raised sua sponte.
Then, on August 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell moved for costs and attorney fees. The
Frantzes objected, but at a hearing on the matter, the district court granted Hawley Troxeii costs
and attorney fees anyway. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Frantz filed his appeal of the district court's
decisions to deny Mr. Katz's motion for admission, grant the Motion to Dismiss, and grant
Hawley Troxell's request for attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pre-Litigation
Mr. Frantz, throughout his career has hired scores of attorneys throughout the western

U.S. and Alaska for transactional work. (R. 204). Nearly all of those attorneys are known to Mr.
Frantz by their name, not by their firm's name. Id.
In or around 2000, Mr. Frantz, or an entity that he controlled, purchased property in
Lewiston, Idaho for the purpose of developing a Guardian Angel Homes assisted living facility.
(R. 194-96)1. Unbeknownst to Mr. Frantz, Mr. Frantz's real estate agent and the land seller

colluded to inflate the price of the land so that the seller would receive more for the property and
the agent would receive a larger commission. Id. Several years later, when the fraud was
discovered, Mr. Frantz hired a Coeur d'Alene attorney to represent him against the seller and the
real estate agent. Id. However, that attorney failed to file against the real estate agent within the

1 The

facts regarding Hawley Troxell' s prior representation were previously set forth in the
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, which comprises pages 194-96 of
the record herein.
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statute

limitations.

was dismissed summarily

on

the statute. Id.
Resultantly, Mr. Frantz filed a malpractice case against his Coeur d'Alene attorney. Id.
In that iitigation, in 2009, Mr. Frantz hired Meriyn Ciark, a partner at Hawley Troxell, to act as
an expert witness on the matter of malpractice liability against Mr. Frantz's former attorney. (R.
15). While Mr. Clark was initially retained as an expert witness, Mr. Clark ended up reviewing
and/or discussing confidential information relating to the value of the Guardian Angel Homes
facility. (R. 15). Further, Mr. Clark consulted on areas of the case outside of Mr. Clark's expert
testimony. (R. 198-99). As a result, Mr. Clark's role morphed from that of a testifying expert to
that of consulting expert thereby forming an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Frantz. Id., see

also R. 197-200. Mr. Frantz personally paid Hawley Troxell more than $10,000 for Mr. Clark's
services. (R. 196).
In 2010, Mr. Frantz got into a dispute with his Bank over a real estate loan. (R. 16). The
Bank hired Hawley Troxell to represent them in that dispute; Mr. Clark did not participate in that
case. Id. As such, Mr. Frantz did not at that time realize he had hired Hawley Troxell before.
(R. 204). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Frantz filed for bankruptcy. (R. 16). Early on in the
bankruptcy case, Mr. Frantz disputed Hawley Troxell's representation based on a potential
conflict of interest relating to a different matter. Id. However, after reviewing that matter, Mr.
Frantz stipulated that under those circumstances there was no conflict. Id. Yet, despite Mr.
Frantz raising the conflict issue, Hawley Troxell ignored Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz's affiliation
and never once mentioned Mr. Clark's connection to Mr. Frantz. (R. 205-06). Notwithstanding
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that

not

Hawley Troxell has repeatedly proclaimed the stipulation as a waiver of any conflict of interest.

Id.
Roughly two years later, the Bank filed an adversary proceeding against Mr. Frantz
alleging that Mr. Frantz had fraudulently represented the value of his assets, including his
Guardian Angel Homes assets (which lawsuit will be referred to as the "Adversary
Proceeding"). (R. 201). In that litigation, the Bank once again hired Hawley Troxell for
representation. (R. 16). Until that time there was no nexus between the confidential information
regarding the valuation of the Guardian Angel Homes assets, which Hawley Troxell possessed,
and the lawsuits to which Mr. Frantz and the Bank were embroiled. (R. 201-03). As a result,
Mr. Frantz did not sustain damages until Hawley Troxell represented the Bank in the Adversary

Proceeding, well after the chapter 7 bankruptcy case was underway. Id.
It was near the end of the Adversary Proceeding when Mr. Frantz discovered that Hawley
Troxell was in possession of confidential information. (R 203-04). Upon discovering such, Mr.
Frantz 1) hired a malpractice attorney, Mr. Jefferey Katz, to represent him in any future litigation
thereon, and 2) moved to disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Adversary Proceeding. (R. 193-212)2.
Pursuant to that representation, Mr. Katz sent a demand letter to Hawley Troxell. Roughly a
month later, the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell was heard in the Adversary Proceeding.
(R. 72). While the judge there denied the motion, the entire Adversary Proceeding was later
dismissed as moot; it never went to trial and there was no final judgment on the merits. (R. 352,
2The

Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell filed in the Adversary Proceeding.
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was deprived of

41

to seek an

ofthe

order denying Mr. Frantz's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell. See Tr, p. 15, In. 21-23.
In the hearing to disqualify Hawley Troxell in the Adversary Proceeding, Mr. Frantz
sought to introduce the expert opinion of Mr. Jeffrey Katz. (R. 3 i 7-24, the expert disciosure for
Mr. Katz). While Mr. Katz, had already agreed to represent Mr. Frantz in litigation against
Hawley Troxell "Mr. Frantz only had a couple of weeks in which to prepare for the evidentiary
hearing" on disqualification, no other expert was available on such short notice. (R. 341).
Regardless, the bankruptcy court did not allow the parties to present any expert testimony. (R.
350, iJl I). As such, Mr. Katz never acted as an expert witness in the case. Id at i!12.

Mr. Katz's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission
Several months later, Mr. Frantz filed this suit against Hawley Troxell in state court. (R.
8). In the meantime, on March 9, 2015, Mr. Katz contacted the Bank about this malpractice
litigation. (R. 332). After receiving no response, this litigation proceeded when Mr. Katz
applied for pro hac vice admission. (R. 22-23). Mr. Frantz served the motion on Hawley Troxell
directly as no attorney had yet appeared on Hawley Troxell' s behalf. Id.
Then, in June 2015, Mr. Frantz contacted the Bank directly with a proposal to end the
litigation between the parties. (R. 333-335). Mr. Frantz's proposal was based on his belief that
the Bank could be a co-plaintiff in this very same litigation against Hawley Troxell. (R. 334)

(" ... it would be an advantage to Hawley-Troxell if [the Bank} were to join in the case . .. ")
3

The entire docket for the Adversary Proceeding was filed. R. 418, docket entry 116 states,
"Hearing Held ... Report of Proceedings ... this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT.
The trial ... is hereby VACATED."
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essence,

the

as a plaintiff,

allow the Bank sole discretion to accept or reject settlement proposals, if any, to itself and Mr.
Frantz, and 3) pay the Bank the first $4,000,000 of settlement proceeds, if any. (R. 333-335).
This wouid ail be in exchange for extinguishing any aiieged indebtedness between Mr. Frantz
and the Bank. Id.
It's true, in the emailed offer Mr. Frantz engaged in puffery and exaggerations, but such
statements are typical of settlement offers. Id. For example, Mr. Frantz made the claim that the
disqualification motion was a "probe" to evaluate this malpractice litigation. (R. 334).
However, that statement is nothing more than posturing as I) Mr. Katz had already agreed to
represent Mr. Frantz in this litigation, and 2) the motion was lost. (R. 346, im. Further, the
disqualification hearing was not a sham but an attempt to prevent Hawley Troxell from claiming
that Mr. Frantz failed to mitigate his damages. (R. 347, ,i 14, R. 350, ,i 9). Regardless, the Bank
never accepted the offer to join this litigation as a co-plaintiff
With this lawsuit underway, Hawley Troxell objected to Mr. Katz's pro hac vice
admission. (R. 24). In its objection Hawley Troxell cited two reasons for preventing Mr. Katz's
admission: 1) Hawley Troxell claimed that the motion was not served on its counsel- despite no
counsel having yet appeared at that time4- and 2) it questioned whether Mr. Katz was aware of
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct and whether or not he would comply with them. (R. 24-

4

Hawley Troxell submitted false, inadmissible hearsay evidence indicating that Hawley
Troxell's counsel had appeared in the matter via a phone conversation with Mr. Frantz's counsel.
See (R. 27-28) Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, (R. 313) hearsay objection to said affidavit, (R.
309-10) Declaration of Jonathon Frantz outlining the actual contents of the phone conversation.
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that
Troxell fabricated ethical violations and concocted a scheme to require Mr. Katz as a witness.
(R. 361-67). To that end, Hawley Troxell made wild claims that Mr. Katz had been
communicating with a represented party, the Bank, even though Hawley Troxell was well aware
that, 1) Mr. Katz had only communicated with the Bank about this lawsuit, and 2) the Bank was
not represented in this matter. (R. 306-308). Then, when Hawley Troxell's fabricated ethical
violation was dispelled, Hawley Troxell claimed that Mr. Katz would be a witness and therefore
could not be act as an attorney pursuant to I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). (R. 363-65). Without consideration
for any attorney-client privilege rules, Hawley Troxell claimed that it wanted to use Mr. Katz's
testimony to show Mr. Frantz' s motive in filing this malpractice litigation. Id.

Mr. Frantz responded by not only pointing out that Mr. Katz had no independent
knowledge of the case, but also that even were he to be a witness, I.R.P.C. 3.7 only bars an
attorney who is a witness from being the attorney during the trial. (R. 428-30). On July 28,
2015, the district court held a hearing on the matter. (R. 439). After the hearing, the court
entered a ruling denying Mr. Katz motion for admission because,
The Court finds Katz will likely have to testify in this case. The Court finds none
of the three exceptions to IRPC 3.7(a) apply to Katz as a witness. Thus, this
Court finds that it would be improper to allow admission pro hac vice of an out of
state attorney who would, if appointed, violate the Idaho Rules of Professional
Responsibility ... , [by violating the] prohibition of likely being a witness in a
matter.

(R. 454). The court believed that Mr. Katz would be a witness because on March 9, 2015, Mr.
Katz sent the Bank's CEO an email stating, "I represent Marty Frantz in a newly filed action
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former attorneys at

I would

to

matter

you and discuss how it may be financially beneficial to you." Id.
The Motion to Dismiss
On May 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell also filed a Motion to Dismiss or Abate pursuant tu
I.R.C.P. l 2(b)(8). (R. 273). The bases for its motion consisted of I) collateral estoppel and/or
res judicata, and 2) that the parties are litigating the same issue in different lawsuits. (R. 27586). The facts supporting Hawley Troxell's first contention revolve entirely around the denial of
the motion to disqualify which Mr. Frantz raised in the Adversary Proceeding. Id. The second
contention is based on the fact that, while the Adversary Proceeding had already been deemed
moot, there was still pending requests for fees and costs. Id.
The Frantzes responded by showing that the Adversary Proceeding had been rendered
moot by the judge in that case and that there would never be any judgment on the merits in the
Adversary Proceeding, and therefore neither issue nor claim preclusion would ever apply. (R.
352-56). Further, with the Adversary Proceeding rendered moot, there was no longer a second
pending action; as such, abatement was improper.
Still, at the July 28, 2015 hearing on this matter, the district court raised sua sponte, its
own issue regarding standing or judicial estoppel. (Tr, p. 9, ln. 17-24). While Mr. Frantz did
address the impromptu issue at the hearing, the following day the district court entered an order
dismissing and abating this case for the following reasons: 1) judicial estoppel (R. 441 ), and 2)
because there is "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause." (R. 452).
The district court, in finding judicial estoppel, relied on the premise that,
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Judicial
"when the
knowledge of enough
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the
bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify
the cause of action as a contingent asset."
(R. 441 )(emphasis in original). The district court went on to find that "It is clear that the cause
of action in this present case arose during the pendency of Frantz' bankruptcy proceedings" and
for that reason applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel and dismissed this matter. (R. 442).
In finding that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, the district relied on the fact that "The same parties in the present case are (and have)
litigating (and have litigated) the same issues in the bankruptcy case." (R. 452) (emphasis
added).

The Motion for Attorney's Fees
After the order dismissing the case was entered, on August 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell
moved for its attorney fees citing I.C.§12-120, claiming this matter is the result of a commercial
transaction, and LC.§ 12-121, asserting that this matter was brought frivolously. (R. 486). Mr.
Frantz objected to the motion because the malpractice matter at issue in this case is not at its
heart a commercial transaction nor was it brought frivolously. (R. 491-495). At oral arguments
on the matter, the district court found that the gravamen of this suit was commercial in nature.
(Tr, pp. 50-52). But it also found that this suit was brought frivolously:
The misguided nature leads also to my alternate finding. . . The relief
sought by Frantz and the legal theory underpinning that requested relief
demonstrate the absurdity of this litigation, and I've already found it to be absurd.
It is not at all a stretch to find it frivolous, and I agree completely with the
defendant's argument that - the underpinning on this state lawsuit that I'm
deciding is that Merlyn Clark was hired as Frantz's attorney, and that was
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never the case, and it can't be the case. He was hired as an expert witness
his attorneys on Frantz's behalf. The bankruptcy court was clear that there
wasn't a - that what Frantz tried to do claiming a conflict wouldn't fly, and then
this lawsuit is filed, and I think having such a clear opinion from the bankruptcy
judge is-results in this case in the state court being frivolous, so its frivolous at
two junctures: One to say that Merlyn Clark was Frantz's attorney and,
second, to fiie this ciaim in state court after a bankruptcy judge had said no,
there's no conflict because he wasn't his attorney.
(Tr, pp. 50-52) ( emphasis added). As such, attorney fees were awarded. Id. at p. 54-55. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Frantz filed an appeal. (R. 501).

Issues Presented on Appeal
1. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz is judicially estopped/lacks standing to
bring a suit which accrued after his chapter 7 bankruptcy commenced?
2. Did the district court err in dismissing this action pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) finding that
another action was pending between the same parties for the same cause when the other
action had already been dismissed as moot?
3. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Katz pro hac vice admission?
4. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3)?
5. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-121?

Argument
MR. FRANTZ IS NOT JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM BRINGING THIS LAWSUIT

The district court misapplied the judicial estoppel/standing issues because the court
believed the proper inquiry was whether or not Mr. Frantz became aware of this litigation during
the pendency of his bankruptcy. However, a proper inquiry looks at when this cause of action
accrued. Because this malpractice action did not accrue until after Mr. Frantz's chapter 7
bankruptcy case began, judicial estoppel cannot apply.
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that at the commencement of a bankruptcy case, an estate is
created. Further, that bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.. , 11 USC §541 (a)(l) (emphasis
added). As a general rule, aii interest obtained after the commencement of a chapter 7 case
remains property of the debtor. Id.
Even causes of action can be included in the bankruptcy's expansive definition of
property. See Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Tr.), 25
F .3d 1281, 1283 (5th Cir. 1994). The determination of whether "a particular state cause of action
belongs to the estate depends on whether under applicable state law the debtor could have
raised the claim as of the commencement of the case." Id. (emphasis added). For example, in
Wade v. Bailey, the parties there did not dispute "that a cause of action belonging to a debtor as
of the [bankruptcy] petition's filing becomes property of the estate." 287 B.R. 874, 881 (S.D.
Miss. June 26, 2001 ). Nor was there a question in Wade "that the causes of action in the instant
case did not belong to the [debtors] until after the petition was filed." Id. Because "the
appellee's claims [in that case] had not accrued as of the commencement of the appellee's
bankruptcy proceeding" the court in Wade found that "the lawsuit in question belongs to the
[debtors], and not the estate, and that the [debtors] have standing to pursue the lawsuit." Id. at
882.
Conversely, in In re Forbes, the court there found that a debtor's cause of action for
wrongful discharge was appropriately property of the estate. 58 B.R. 706, 707 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986). The court reached this conclusion by reviewing the following facts:
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defendant believed from the moment
was
(two
months before bankruptcy) that he had been illegally terminated by the city.
The cause of action for tortuously interfering with a contract accrues when the
damage is suffered.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation removed). Because the cause of action accrued before the debtor

in Forbes filed his bankruptcy petition, it was property of the estate. Id. Therefore, what the
courts look at to determine whether or not a cause of action belongs to the debtor is whether or
not the cause of action accrued before or after the debtor files bankruptcy.
It is important to distinguish between when a cause of action accrued and when the action

was filed. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. Ct. App.
2001 ). It does not matter when the cause of action was filed; it only matters when it accrued. Id.
at 784-85. In Hamilton, a debtor had knowledge that "a cause of action against State Farm
existed at the time he filed for bankruptcy." Id. at 785. However, he failed to disclose that claim
in his bankruptcy and waited until one year after his bankruptcy before filing the claim. Id. at
784. Still, it did not matter when the case was filed, only that it existed and he knew about it at
the time he filed for bankruptcy; therefore, the claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Id.
In the case at bar, Mr. Frantz was not damaged until after his chapter 7 bankruptcy case
had cornmenced. 5 Hawley Troxell did not file the Bank's Adversary Proceeding until well after
the chapter 7 case was underway; Hawley Troxell did not use Mr. Frantz's confidential
information until after the chapter 7 bankruptcy had already commenced. Like Wade, neither
Hawley Troxell nor the district court contend "that the causes of action in the instant case did not

5

This fact is not in contention by either Hawley Troxell or the district court.
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was

court

concludes that Mr. Frantz knew about the cause of action during the pendency of the bankruptcy.
As a result, like in Wade, where the claim was found to belong to the debtor, this instant lawsuit
by Mr. Frantz against Hawiey TroxeH appropriately belongs to Mr. Frantz.
Unlike Forbes, where the cause of action accrued two months before bankruptcy, Mr.
Frantz' s cause of action against Hawley Troxell did not arise until after the bankruptcy case was
filed. Therefore, while the estate in Forbes owned the cause of action, here the estate does not
own Mr. Frantz's cause of action.
The district court's primary error comes from its uncomplete reading of McCallister v.

Dixon. 154 Idaho 891 (2013). The district court's opinion relies heavily on McCallister. See R.
440-444, Memorandum Decision and Order. However, the district court errantly cites

McCallister, and the opinions on which it relies, for the proposition that,
Judicial estoppel will be applied 'when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the
bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify
the cause of action a as a contingent asset.'
(R. 441) (emphasis in the Order). The district court specifically emphasized the phrase, "during

the pendency of the bankruptcy" because it mistakenly believed that all lawsuits that arise during

6

It should be noted that Hawley Troxell actually did not make any claims as the court raised this
matter sua sponte. However, the court, like in Wade, admits that Mr. Frantz's claim against
Hawley Troxell arose "during the pending bankruptcy proceeding." (R. 440). A claim that
arises during a pending bankruptcy proceeding necessarily have arisen after the bankruptcy was
filed.
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estate.

rest

of the district court's opinion. The district court continued,
The bankruptcy case was ongoing at the time the Complaint was filed. The focus
of this Court's inquiry is when Frantz became aware of the potential malpractice.
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Frantz had knowiedge of any potentiai iegai
malpractice claims against Hawley Troxell during the bankruptcy proceeding ...
(R. 444) (emphasis added). The foregoing ruling is demonstrative of the district court's error.
The district court concluded that, since Mr. Frantz became aware of the case during his
bankruptcy, pursuant to McCallister the claim against Hawley Troxell belongs to the estate, not
Mr. Frantz.
However, the district court should not have "focused" on when Mr. Frantz became aware
of the potential malpractice, but on when the malpractice case accrued in relation to when the
bankruptcy case was filed. Mr. Frantz's claim against Hawley Troxell did not accrue until after
the bankruptcy case was well underway. As discussed above, neither the district court nor
Hawley Troxell contend otherwise. As such, the district court plainly erred when it dismissed
Mr. Frantz's case based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel or standing.

THERE WAS NO OTHER ACTION PENDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
The district court next misapplied 12(b)(8) abatement by concluding that there was
another action pending between the same parties over the same matter even though the elements
for disqualification are vastly different from the elements of malpractice. In Idaho, there is little
guidance on what is deemed to be the "same matter." However, other states offer valuable
insight.
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Indiana.

two matters are

"same

depends on

"the

the subject matter, and remedies are precisely or even substantially the same in both suits."
David v. Perron, 716 NE 2d 29, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v.
Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 323 (S.C. Ct. App. 20 i 0) ("the claim must be precisely or substantially
the same in both proceedings in order for the drastic remedy of dismissal to be appropriate under

Rule I2(b)(8).").
Moreover, Illinois has already reviewed the question of whether or not a motion to
disqualify is the same matter as a related, subsequent malpractice case. See e.g. Eckert v.
Freeborn & Peters LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23477, at 12-14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2015). In
Eckert, the district court there reviewed whether or not a denial of a motion to disqualify could

bar the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim after an unsuccessful motion to disqualify in a
different proceeding. Id. 12-14. The court there determined that it could not because the
"alleged legal malpractice is not 'identical' to the question presented by [the plaintiffs] motion
to disqualify." Id. at 13. The court reasoned that
in order to prevail on a claim of attorney malpractice, a plaintiff must succeed in
proving four elements: (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty on
the attorney's part; (2) a negligent act or omission by the attorney amounting to a
breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause establishing that but for the attorney's
negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action; and (4)
actual damages. By contrast, ' [d]isqualification motions require a two-step
analysis. The court must consider (1) whether an ethical violation has actually
occurred, and (2) if disqualification is the appropriate remedy.'
Id. at 13-14 (citations removed). This same consideration applies in Idaho. See Foster v. Traul,

145 Idaho 24, 32-33 (2007) (setting forth the elements for disqualification as: I) whether the
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the
be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted, 3) whether there are any alternative
solutions, and 4) whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh the benefits that might
accrue to continued representation). The ldaho elements of legal malpractice are all but identical
to those espoused in Eckert. See e.g. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590 (2001 ). As such, just
like the lack of overlapping elements between disqualification and malpractice in Eckert, Idaho's
disqualification and malpractice elements do not overlap. Thus, a motion to disqualify should
not bar the prosecution of a malpractice claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8).
Additionally, the same result occurs if Indiana's approach is adopted. While the parties
and subject matter in disqualification motions and malpractice suits may be substantially similar,
the remedies sought could not be any more different. A disqualification motion is a defensive
technique preventing harm while a malpractice suit seeks redress for harm already caused; one is
a sword while the other is a shield. In a disqualification, at worst an attorney is prevented from
representing a party; in a malpractice suit, at worst the breaching attorney will owe the plaintiff
money. As such, the two different proceedings cannot be deemed as the "same" for the purposes
of I.R.C.P. l 2(b)(8) because their remedies are drastically different.
Furthermore, there are other policy considerations that warrant keeping motions to
disqualify separate from malpractice claims under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). A party to a malpractice
claim has the right to have such a claim to be considered by a jury while a disqualification
motion is considered solely by a judge. To intertwine the two matters would be to potentially
rob the parties of a jury trial.

Appellant's Brief- Pg. 17

the
motion in order to foreclose the defense of failure to mitigate. After all, if Mr. Frantz had
foregone the disqualification motion and then filed this malpractice litigation Hawley Troxell
wouid rightfuiiy have good cause to wonder why Mr. Frantz did nothing to try and prevent the
breach. However, because Mr. Frantz did act to try and prevent the breach (by filing a motion to
disqualify) if that hearing bars his future litigation, Mr. Frantz will be deprived a jury
determination of his malpractice claim because a judge alone determined the disqualification
motion, which would then be used to bar Mr. Frantz's right to malpractice litigation. Such a
quasi-deprivation of the right to a jury trial would also have a chilling effect on plaintiffs
willingness to mitigate damages and potential plaintiffs would be forced to choose between a
jury and loss mitigation.
Additionally, the burdens of proof are different. The burden of disqualification consists
of an intricate weighing of prejudice versus the legal system's integrity, while malpractice
requires simply a preponderance of the evidence. As such, the fact that Mr. Frantz failed in his
attempt to disqualify Hawley Troxell should not now bar him from bringing this litigation under
l 2(b)(8) because the two matters are not the "same."
Even if the two matters were the same, in this case abatement should not have been
granted because the Adversary Proceeding was mooted denying Mr. Frantz a judgment on the
merits. The roots of abatement come from considerations of judicial economy. Scott v. Agric.

Prods. Corp., 102 Idaho 147, 150 (1981). Abatement is closely related to the considerations of
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e.g.
Johnson, 147 Idaho 912,917 (2009). In Idaho
[t]wo tests govern the determination of whether a lawsuit should proceed where a
similar lawsuit is pending in another court. First, the court should consider
whether the other case has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrine of ciaim
preclusion and issue preclusion may bar the litigation. The second test is ...
whether the court in which the matter already is pending is in a position to
determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights ~f the parties.
Klaue, supra. at 440. (citations removed) (emphasis in original). The second test, abatement,
only comes into play when no final judgment on the merits has been entered yet. In essence,
abatement is the ·'wait-and-see" approach; let us wait and see what happens in the other, similar
case before we proceed with this one.
In the case at bar, that approach does not make any sense because there will never, ever
be a final judgment on the merits because the Adversary Proceeding was dismissed as moot.
There can never be any appeal from the denial of the motion to disqualify because the entire
Adversary Proceeding was mooted. It is true, there were judgments entered in the Adversary
Proceeding (i.e. for fees and costs). But there was no judgment on the merits of the case, no
ruling on any matter contained within the complaint. And there never will be. As such, even if
there was a "same matter" at some point in time, there certainly was none at the time the district
court issued its opinion. It was mooted.
It is important to note that Hawley Troxell and the district court both got lost in the fact
that the bankruptcy case (not the Adversary Proceeding) is still pending. However, that fact is
nothing more than a red herring as the bankruptcy case does not and cannot operate to provide
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with a final
that the bankruptcy case continues will not reverse the effects of the mooting of the Adversary
Proceeding. Mr. Frantz is not endowed with authority to appeal the denial of his motion to
disqualify merely because the bankruptcy case marches on. Instead, when the Adversary
Proceeding was mooted, so too were Mr. Frantz's chances for appeal; likewise, the chance for a
final resolution on the merits were mooted. As such, it does not matter that the bankruptcy case
ensues.
Lastly, even if this matter is to be dismissed, it should not be dismissed with prejudice as
was done in the instant case because then the dismissal with prejudice would affect the
proceeding in the other case. See Scott v. Agricultural Prods. Corp., 102 Idaho 14 7, 150-51
(1981).

MR. KATZ SHOULD BE ADM/TED PRO HAC VICE
Idaho has no case law interpreting when pro hac vice admission should be granted.
However, other jurisdictions have met this question head on. The fifth and eleventh Circuits
have held,
The District Court may [only] refuse to admit a lawyer, otherwise qualified, on a
showing that in any legal matter ... he has been guilty of unethical conduct of
such a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of
the court.

3 F3d 1553,1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (the eleventh circuit continued to apply the same standard
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it split from the fifth

not

conduct, let alone have cause to be disbarred, he must be granted admission.
While the district court recklessly claims that Mr. Katz "would, if appointed, violate the
idaho Ruies of Professionai Responsibiiity, possibly for unauthorized contact" that allegation
was not supported by any facts or consideration and ultimately the district court did "not decide
that issue now." (R. 454). But even had it decided that issue, there is but one possible outcome:
that Mr. Katz abided by Idaho's ethical rules; Mr. Katz never made unauthorized conduct
because the Bank has never been represented by an attorney in this litigation.
Hawley Troxell has claimed that it represents the Bank. While it is true, Hawley Troxell
represents the Bank in the bankruptcy case and in the Adversary Proceeding, it has made no
notice of appearance, nor letter, nor email, nor phone call informing Mr. Katz, Attorney Frantz,
or Mr. Frantz that the Bank is represented in this matter. Mr. Katz has only ever contacted the
Bank in regards to this present litigation. (R. 347, ,J20). There is simply no evidence to the
contrary. The record is completely bereft of any evidence, direct, causal, circumstantial, or
otherwise that would allow even an inference the Mr. Katz contacted the Bank in regards to any
other case. As such, it is patently impossible for a court to find that Mr. Katz made unauthorized
contact. Furthermore, to makes such a flippant, yet serious accusation while "not decid[ing] that
issue now" is simply "misguided."
The district court did, however, decide that "Mr. Katz will likely have to testify." As a
result, it barred Mr. Katz based on I.R.P.C. 3.7(a), lawyer as witness. I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) states, "A
lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
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(emphasis

is applicable only at a

vast

case

will likely take place outside of trial: for example in discovery, depositions, expert disclosures,
pre-trial motions, etc. As such, even if Mr. Katz is a necessary witness he should still be
admitted and ailowed to represent Mr. Frantz in this matter up until trial. Besides, this case
never made it pass the pleadings stage (after all, this case was dismissed on a 12(b) motion).
With zero discovery conducted it seems a little early to be deciding who is a necessary witness at
a trial which was never even scheduled.
Therefore, since Mr. Katz has not violated any ethical rules and because I.R.P.C. 3.7(a)
only limits a likely witness from being an attorney at trial, Mr. Katz admission pro hac vice
should be granted. In the event that Mr. Katz does wind up likely being a necessary witness at
trial, he would then properly be barred from representing Mr. Frantz at that time, but not until
then.

ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO LC.§12-120(3)
The next error by the district court is finding that the gravamen of this matter is a
commercial transaction. It is true that Idaho allows attorney fees in malpractice lawsuits,
however, it does not allow them when "[t]he gravamen of [the] case was an effort to enforce a
statutory scheme ... " Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,631 (1995). Instead, the
commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the
party seeks to recover. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995).
In Kelly, the lawsuit sought dissolution of the partnership which was formed for
commercial purposes (real estate development). 127 Idaho at 626. The dissolution sought,
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was to

state statute.

at

the

attorney fees to the prevailing party under I.C.§ 12-120(3) because the suit was to enforce a
statutory scheme, not a commercial transaction. Id. at 631.
Said another way, the commercial transaction entered into in Kelly was to form a forprofit partnership. From that commercial transaction, other duties (namely the duty to perform
dissolution) sprang forth from the statutory scheme which was triggered when the partners
formed their partnership.
In the present case, the commercial transaction occurred when Mr. Clark became an
expert consultant for Mr. Frantz (like the forming of the partnership in Kelly). Mr. Frantz hired
Mr. Clark to provide competent testimony and advice. Mr. Clark was not hired to provide Mr.
Frantz with loyalty; Mr. Clark was not hired to keep Mr. Frantz's confidential information
confidential. Instead, Mr. Clark's duty of loyalty, his duty to keep Mr. Frantz's confidential
information confidential sprang up from a statutory scheme 7, not the commercial transaction (the
same way the duty to perform dissolution sprang up from the statutory scheme of partnership
law, not the act of forming a partnership).
Mr. Clark's (and Hawley Troxell's) duties are derived from the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. As such, the only reason the commercial transaction is even mentioned is
because it triggered the statutory framework of Hawley Troxell' s professional responsibilities.
The duties Hawley Troxell violated spring from that statutory scheme the same way the duties to
perform dissolution in Kelly sprang from Idaho partnership statutes.
7

The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.

Appellant's Brief- Pg. 23

way,

hiring Mr.

IS

this matter. The crux of this claim is a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct As
such, since the commercial transaction here in not integral to this claim, but instead it is
anciilary. Therefore attorney fees are not appropriate under LC.§ 12-120(3).

ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE DENIED PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-121
The last assignment of error by the district court is in finding that this matter was
frivolous and thereby awarding attorney fees under § 12-121. The district court found that this
case was frivolous because,
The underpinning of this state lawsuit that I'm deciding is that Merlyn Clark was
hired as Frantz's attorney, and that never was the case, and it can't be the case.
He was hired as an expert witness by his attorneys on Frantz's behalf. The
bankruptcy court was clear that there wasn't a -- ... a bankruptcy judge had said
no, there's no conflict because [Mr. Clark] wasn't [Mr. Frantz's] attorney.
(Tr, p. 52, 11. 1-9, 14-16). The district court clarified that this matter was frivolous "at two
junctures: one to say that Merlyn Clark was Frantz's attorney and, second, to file this claim in
state court after a bankruptcy judge had said no, there's no conflict because he wasn't his
attorney." Id. at 11. 12-16.
In short, the district court found this matter frivolous because this matter had already
been decided in the bankruptcy court. That is claim or issue preclusion. The district court
concludes that Mr. Clark was never Mr. Frantz's attorney because the bankruptcy court already
determined that he was not. But, the district court concluded in its opinion on dismissal that
claim preclusion and issue preclusion do not apply because there was not and will not be a final
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not

to

simply cannot operate to make it frivolous. It simply does not make sense.
For the reasons laid out above, the bankruptcy court's opinion about whether or not an
attorney-client relationship was formed simply is immaterial, moot. It may be indicative, but it
certainly is not probative. Both Mr. Frantz and the district court agree that res judicata cannot
bar this claim because there is not and will not be a final judgment on the merits. How then, can
that be the basis for finding frivolity when it is not even a basis for dismissal?
Because the district court impermissibly finds frivolousness in an action that the court
itself deemed to comply with the law (by not dismissing the case for that reason) the finding of
frivolity and the subsequent granting of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.§121 cannot stand.

Conclusion
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the orders of the district
court and deny Hawley Troxell's motion to dismiss or abate, grant Mr. Katz's motion for pro hac
vice admission, and deny Hawley Troxell's motions for fees and costs.

Respectfully submitted on this 19th day of January, 2016.
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By:_/s/_ _ __
Jonathon Frantz,
Attorney for Appellant.
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